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Abstract—The confidentiality of communications in the Inter-
net of Things (IoT) is critical, with cryptography being currently
the most widely employed method to achieve it. Establish-
ing cryptographically secure communication links between two
transceivers requires the pre-agreement on some key, unknown to
an external attacker. In recent years there has been growing in-
terest for techniques that generate a shared random key through
observation of the channel and its effects on the exchanged
messages. The maximum length of that key is characterised
by the Mutual Information (MI) between the observations of
the two radios. In this work we examine the practical limits of
the MI of off-the-shelf transceivers communicating through the
IEEE 802.15.4 specification in an indoor office environment, and
calculate the secret-key capacity, that is, the maximum length
of an extracted secret-key in the presence of an eavesdropper.
Furthermore, we study how using groups of observations can
affect the MI and both analytically and experimentally prove that
grouping observations leads to better results and an increased
key-capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
The vision of an Internet of Things (IoT) is coming closer to
realisation with each passing day, where physical objects will
have virtual representations, they will be controlled remotely
and act as physical access points to Internet services [1].
Thus the physical world will be controllable through the
virtual one. However, this introduces new risks since attackers
can potentially gain access to systems considered so far as
secure. Furthermore the broadcasting nature of wireless sensor
networks (WSN), that will form a large part of the IoT,
makes communications prone to eavesdropping, increasing the
need for confidentiality, which currently is accomplished by
cryptographic schemes.
However the nodes that will comprise these WSN are often
weak, both in terms of computational capabilities and security
measures, as they are very constrained in hardware space,
processor power and battery life. Thus security services that
reside in the higher levels of the OSI model, such as tradi-
tional cryptographic protocols that require key distributions or
certificate management [2], might not be sufficiently efficient
for IoT devices. Due to this, in recent years there has been
a renewed effort into devising security schemes that reside
in the physical layer and can supplement novel lightweight
cryptographic protocols [3], [4], [5].
A promising direction seems to be using observations of
the common channel between two transceivers to agree to a
bit sequence that can be then used as a seed for a crypto-
graphic primitive or as an encryption key. Using the theory
of reciprocity for antennas and electromagnetic propagation,
and assuming that bidirectional transmissions occur inside the
coherence time, methods [6], [7] have been proposed for the
communicating parties to agree to a key based on the channel
impulse response. The maximum size of a binary sequence that
can be shared this way is characterised by the MI between the
observations of the two radios.
In the past, theoretical work has been done in calculating the
upper bound of the MI for a variety of channels [8], [9], [10].
However, there is still no work that examines the achievable
MI with off-the-shelf components in real-life implementations.
Past experimental works in the field have attempted to measure
the entropy of the Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI)
observations as an indication of the length of the extracted
shared bit sequence, however they need to rely on Forward
Error Correction (FEC) to correct errors that result from incon-
sistencies between the two extracted sequences. Measuring the
MI, takes this one step ahead, by quantifying the circumstances
when FEC is less or more necessary.
In this work we initially measure the MI of two IEEE
802.15.4 transceivers that use the Texas Instrument’s CC2650
System-on-Chip (SoC) [11]. Due to the nature of the
transceivers the only observation of the channel that can be
done without additional hardware is a measurement of the
RSSI of every received packet. This paper makes the following
contributions:
• We calculate the MI of the RSSI measurements of two
communicating parties with and without knowledge of
the RSSI values of the eavesdropped packets. This allows
us to quantify both the maximum key length that can be
agreed upon, as well as the maximum key length that can
be agreed in secrecy from an eavesdropper.
• We study the effects of using groups of different size of
RSSI values instead of point-values as observations, and
its effects on the MI between the two communicating
parties and derive an expression for the MI of groups of
observations under the assumption of stationarity.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section II
covers prior work in the domain. Section III defines the
threat model and the characteristics of the eavesdropper, while
Section IV provides a short introduction to MI and key-rates.
Section V describes our methodology and experimental set-
up, and presents our results, followed by Section VI where we
present our work on vectoring and its effects on MI. Finally
Section VII includes our conclusions.
II. PRIOR WORK
The idea of generating a shared random key at two termi-
nals, by exploiting some common randomness of the commu-
nicating medium has been examined in the past. Ahlswede and
Csisza´r in [9] and [10] published some of the seminal work
on the field where they explored the generation of common
randomness by two terminals without giving information about
it to a third party. They also defined the concept of key-
capacity, that is the maximum rate of the generation of a secret
key by a pair of terminals observing correlated sources, and
proved that in the case of a Discreet Memoryless Multiple
Source Model (DMMS) the key-capacity is equal to the MI.
Their work was extended in [8] by quantifying the theoreti-
cal upper bounds of the length of the common randomness in
bits for ultrawideband channels. The authors calculate the MI
and use it to characterise the maximum key size that can be
shared through observations of the channel pulse response.
The aforementioned works focus on finding the upper
bounds of the MI. However these bounds are only theoretically
possible and practically unattainable without using specialised
equipment. The maximum size as well as generation of shared
secret keys from the observation and processing of radio chan-
nel parameters have also been examined in [7], [12], [13], [14].
However the aforementioned works examine the subject either
purely from a theoretical informational-theoretic perspective,
or by performing the observations with specialised hardware.
In contrast, our work is the first to use experimental results
with off-the-shelf components designed for IoT applications,
to measure MI between two terminals.
III. THREAT MODEL
Calculating the MI between the observations of a random
variable by two communicating parties is important to quantify
the size of the bit sequence that they can agree upon, however
from a security perspective we are interested more in the size
of the key that can be agreed in secret from an eavesdropper.
Before we continue then, we need to define the eaves-
dropper’s abilities. We assume that the eavesdropper, Eve,
can listen to all communications between the legitimate com-
municating parties, Alice and Bob. We also assume that the
eavesdropper can record the RSSI values of the overheard
messages. We make no assumptions on the location of Eve
in relation to Alice or Bob, apart from the fact that Eve is at
least further than the coherence distance from both of them
[15]. Furthermore we assume that Eve is completely passive,
that is, she does not attempt to jam the medium, inject traffic
or in general transmit at any time. We make no assumption
on the hardware capabilities of Eve. For the rest of this paper
the terms Alice, Bob and Eve are used interchangeably with
A, B and E respectively.
IV. MUTUAL INFORMATION AND KEY-CAPACITY
A. Key-Capacity
The mutual information I(X;Y ) is the reduction in the
uncertainty of X due to the knowledge of Y (and the inverse)
and can be expressed as:
I(X;Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |X) , (1)
where
H(X) = −
∑
x∈X
p(x)log2p(x) , (2)
H(Y ) = −
∑
y∈Y
p(y)log2p(y) , (3)
and
H(X|Y ) = −
∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈X
p(x, y)log2p(x|y) . (4)
H(Y |X) can be expressed similarly. We use the observed
frequencies of x and y for the calculation of p(x) and p(y).
In other words, I(X;Y ) quantifies the “amount of informa-
tion” (in bits) obtained about one random variable, through the
other random variable, but also I(X;Y ) is the Key-Capacity,
that is the maximum achievable key-rate, as defined in [9].
In our case the random variables are measurements of the
RSSI of every packet exchanged. Thus, X is the sequence of
RSSI values measured by Alice, and Y the sequence of RSSI
values measured by Bob. Unfortunately, we are limited in the
time resolution of the RSSI measurements, as current off-the-
shelf wireless transceivers report RSSI per frame and not per
symbol.
If X and Y were independent and uncorrelated, we would
expect I(X;Y ) to be zero, however that is not the case due to
the reciprocity of the channel. Furthermore from (1) we can
see that the attainable MI is upper-bounded by the entropy
of the two sources. Hence, scenarios where H(X), H(Y ) are
higher can potentially lead to higher key-capacities.
B. Secret Key-Capacity
If Alice and Bob wish to agree to a key that is kept secret
from an eavesdropper, Eve, then the upper bound might not be
equal to I(X;Y ). Assume that Eve observes the transmitted
packets and logs their RSSI values, zx ∈ Zx and zy ∈ Zy
respectively for X and Y . Then the secret key-capacity is
upper bounded [8] by
K(X;Y ||Z) = min[I(X;Y ), I(X;Y |Zx),
I(X;Y |Zy), I(X;Y |ZxZy)] .
(5)
It is important to remember that I(X;Y |Z) can be smaller or
bigger than I(X;Y ). We should also keep in mind that due to
packet loss, it is possible for Eve to fail to capture some of the
exchanged packets. Aiming to study the worst case scenario,
in this work, we assume that Eve is able to log all of the
Fig. 1. The methodology of RSSI logging.
packets. Practically, we implement this by considering only the
packets that were successfully received by the eavesdropper in
the calculations of the MI.
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We implemented our system on three SmartRF06 evaluation
boards [16] using the CC2650 radio [11]. Two of the boards
act as Alice and Bob, while the third acts as Eve. In Figure 2,
we detail the spatial arrangement of Alice, Bob and Eve in
each scenario.
Commercial wireless transceivers are currently half-duplex,
thus the logged RSSI values correspond to messages that have
a small time delay of each other. The process of message
exchange can be seen in Figure 1, where tp is the transmission
delay, tc the time needed for Bob to measure the RSSI value
of the message and respond with another message, and tf the
time between two successive beacon messages sent by Alice.
To ensure the reciprocity of radio wave propagation we have
to keep tc as small as possible. For the purposes of this work
tp = 2.4 ms while tc = 7.8 ms and tf = 1 s.
A. Scenario 1: Anechoic Chamber
As an initial step we examine the results of our experiment
in a completely isolated and static environment to verify
the basic assumption of our work, i.e. the main source of
randomness in the observations is the channel. To ensure that
there is no interference we use the anechoic chamber of the
University of Bristol. The layout of the experiment can be
seen in Figure 2 (right). In such environment, we expected
minimal to no variations of RSSI. Our measurements verified
our expectations, as can be seen in the first scatter plot in
Figure 4 where we can see that both sequences of observations
alternated between only two values.
Specifically, in Figure 3 we observe that the RSSI of the
packets that were received by Alice have zero variance, thus
the entropy is zero. It follows then, that the MI is also zero.
Yet, the RSSI of the packets received by Bob deviates between
two values. We attribute this to the effects of thermal noise
(which are independent sources of noise present in both Alice
and Bob). Indeed, it is possible that, contrary to Bob, these
variations are not sufficient to cross the quantisation threshold
in Alice’s measurements.
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Fig. 2. Left: Layout of experiment in office space. Right: Layout of
experiment in the anechoic chamber.
Fig. 3. RSSI of packets exchanged in the anechoic chamber.
Eve is passively eavesdropping all the transmitted messages.
Being herself immobile and passive, Eve does not affect the
channel in any way. Thus, we expect little to no variations in
the logged values. Again, the results support our expectations,
as it can been seen in Figure 3. The difference in the absolute
values is the result of different distances between Alice and
Bob, which lead to different path loss.
We can observe that the packets received from Bob have a
constant RSSI of −53 dBm, whilst the RSSI of the packets
received from Alice alternate between two values, −65 dBm
and −64 dBm. The fact that this variation bears no correla-
tion to the aforementioned (correlation coefficient is 0.0141)
indicates that it is indeed the result of random thermal noise.
This also implies that there is potentially randomness in our
observations that is not a result of the channel, however is
uncorrelated and not shared. Hence, this randomness does not
increase the MI, which in this case is zero.
B. Scenario 2: Office Space
We proceed now on a more realistic scenario: an open office
space whose layout can be seen in Figure 2 (left). This scenario
represents a very likely application, especially as IoT devices
find themselves in residential and commercial locations. We
examine two different scenarios:
Fig. 4. Scatterplots of the unique pairs of RSSI values exchanged between Al-
ice and Bob in the different scenarios. Scenario 1 (top left) corresponds to the
anechoic chamber. Scenario 2a (top right) corresponds to the experiments in
the office space during working hours. Scenario 2b (bottom left) corresponds
to the experiments in the office space during non-working hours. Scenario 3
(bottom right) corresponds to the experiment with mobile terminals.
• During working hours, when the office is more busy, and
people are moving in the office and in outside spaces.
• After working hours, when there is minimum-to-no ac-
tivity both in the office and in the surroundings of it.
For each case we examine situations where either there is or
there is no Line-of-Sight (LoS) between Alice, Bob and Eve.
1) Working hours: For the purposes of this work we define
working hours between 09:00 and 17:00. As we would expect
this is the most dynamic of the two cases, as is illustrated in
Figures 5 and 4 where we can see the resulting RSSI values
and their correlation correspondingly. In this case, people are
working in their offices with frequent movement while Alice,
Bob and Eve all have LoS. The MI is 2.5009 bits while the
minimum entropy between Alice’s and Bob’s observations is
Alice’s, being 3.6389 bits. The secret-key capacity is 2.4729
bits.
2) Non-Working hours: We define as night hours the time
from 00:00 to 06:00. This part of the experiment bears
similarities to the experiment in the anechoic chamber, since
although there are a number of multipaths, there are very few
variations in the environment, leading to a relatively static
channel. This is illustrated in Figure 4 where we can see that
we have a reduced number of unique measured values. The
MI is 0.1964 bits with the minimum entropy between the two
sets of observations being 0.7805 bits, from Bob’s observations
while the secret-key capacity is 0.1665 bits.
C. Scenario 3: Mobile terminals
In the last scenario we examine the communication between
a stationary base-station and a mobile terminal. This scenario
was run in two different circumstances, with the results being
fairly similar. As Alice is moving around and out of the office
space, LoS is lost and re-established, the pathways change
x x
xx
Fig. 5. RSSI of packets captured in the office space during working hours.
Top left: RSSI logged by Alice. Top right: RSSI logged by Bob. Bottom left:
RSSI logged by Eve from eavesdropped packets directed to Alice. Bottom
right: RSSI logged by Eve from eavesdropped packets directed to Bob.
Fig. 6. RSSI of packets exchanged between Alice and Bob when Alice is
mobile. Top left: RSSI logged by Alice. Top right: RSSI logged by Bob.
Bottom left: RSSI logged by Eve from eavesdropped packets directed to Alice.
Bottom right: RSSI logged by Eve from eavesdropped packets directed to Bob.
and thus we would expect to see great variation in the logged
RSSI values. Indeed, the results back our expectations as can
be seen in the last scatterplot of Figure 4 and in Figure 6.
The MI in the first run is 3.1289 bits, while the entropy
of Alice’s observations is 4.5416 bits. The secret-key capacity
is 2.9187 bits. This scenario results in the highest amount of
entropy and mutual information, a result of the much more
dynamic nature of the channel due to the movement of Alice.
D. Summary
The results of all our experiments are summarised in Table I.
Overall, it can be observed that dynamic scenarios, such
as an office during working hours and a mobile terminal,
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF OUR RESULTS FOR ALL SCENARIOS. X IS THE SEQUENCE OF OBSERVATIONS BY ALICE, Y THE SEQUENCE OF OBSERVATIONS BY BOB
AND Zx , Zy THE SEQUENCE OF OBSERVATIONS BY EVE OF PACKETS THAT FORM X AND Y RESPECTIVELY. THE PRACTICAL SECRET KEY-CAPACITY
FOR EACH SCENARIO, AS DEFINED IN (5), IS MARKED IN RED.
Scenario min(H(X), H(Y )) I(X;Y ) I(X;Y |Zx) I(X;Y |Zy) I(X;Y |Zx, Zy)
Office: Working hours
A,B and E have LoS 3.6389 2.5009 2.4909 2.5030 2.4739
A,B have LoS, E without LoS 3.6348 2.5662 2.5462 2.4700 2.4247
A,B and E without LoS 3.8684 2.8507 2.6780 2.8214 2.5926
Office: Non-Working hours
A,B and E have LoS 0.7805 0.1964 0.1761 0.1817 0.1665
A,B have LoS, E without LoS 1.3118 0.4615 0.4624 0.4594 0.4613
A,B and E without LoS 1.0038 0.2668 0.1603 0.2661 0.1595
Mobile Scenario 1 4.5416 3.1289 3.0799 3.0635 2.9187
Mobile Scenario 2 4.8330 3.3073 3.3574 3.3963 3.0517
practically yield a relatively high secret-key capacity of up
3.0517 bits. We next proceed with considering groups of
sequential observations as a means to further increase the
secret-key capacity.
VI. GROUPING OBSERVATIONS
In the previous sections we assumed that the observations
that form X and Y are point-values of the RSSI. However,
we can instead choose to use groups of RSSI values for each
observation. Thus instead of p(x) resulting from a distribution
of measurements, it is the result of a distribution of vectors,
increasing the dimensionality of our observations.
Assume, for example, that we aim to use two sub-
sequent RSSI values as an observation xi. Then xi =
[RSSIi, RSSIi+1] where i ∈ [1, 3, 5..N − 1] and N the
number of RSSI observations. In this case the set of X is
comprised by 807 unique elements in the scenario of working
hours in an office (Section V-B1), while without vectoring the
set is comprised by only 62 unique elements. However the
number of our samples has now been halved. X is no longer
a vector 1×N but a matrix 2× (N/2). The MI in this case is
5.7875 bits with the entropy of X now reaching 8.0402 bits.
The effects of using groups of different sizes to the MI
are presented in Figure 7, while the ratio of MI of groups
of observations over the MI of point values is presented in
Figure 8. For example, for the mobile scenario (Section V-C),
the MI of groups of observations can get as high as 10.68 bits
while the MI of point-values was only 3.12 bits. We prove
analytically in the appendix the benefit of using groups of
observations instead of point values.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In recent years there has been a renewed focus in physical
layer security schemes that can supplement lightweight cryp-
tographic protocols for IoT applications. Extracting a shared
bit sequence through observations of the wireless medium
is a promising direction in that regard, and the upper limit
of the size of that bit sequence, known as key-capacity, is
characterised by the MI between the observations of the two
communicating parties.
In this work, we have examined the MI between two off-the-
shelf wireless transceivers that employ IEEE 802.15.4 radios
Fig. 7. Effects of using sequences of different sizes of RSSI values as xi.
Fig. 8. Ratio of MI of groups over MI of point-values as xi increases.
to communicate, in real-life experiments and in a variety of
situations. Furthermore we explore the effects of vectoring
observations to the key-capacity. We analytically prove that
this leads to better results for stationary sequences, and nu-
merically show that our stationary model produces sequences
that closely follow the entropy and mutual information of our
observed sequences. Vectoring the observations logged from
a mobile client was shown to lead to mutual information of
up to 10.68 bits, while using scalars for the same application
resulted in mutual information of only 3.12 bits.
To the best of our knowledge this is the first work that
employs off-the-shelf components to measure the MI, and that
explores the effects of grouping observations with experimen-
tal results, thus making our results immediately applicable to
on-the-field implementations.
APPENDIX
We proceed to prove that the MI of groups of observations is
always greater or equal to MI of scalars under the assumption
of stationarity. We know that
I(xn; yn) = H(xn) +H(yn)−H(xn, yn) (6)
thus
I(xn, xn+1; yn, yn+1) =H(xn, xn+1) +H(yn, yn+1)
−H(xn, xn+1, yn, yn+1)
(7)
However,
H(xn, xn+1, yn, yn+1) =H(xn, yn) +H(xn+1, yn+1)
− I(xn, yn;xn+1, yn+1)
(8)
Substituting (8) in (7):
I(xn, xn+1; yn, yn+1) =H(xn) +H(xn+1|xn)
+H(yn) +H(yn+1|yn)
−H(xn, yn)−H(xn+1, yn+1)
+ I(xn, yn;xn+1, yn+1)
and because of (6):
I(xn, xn+1; yn, yn+1) =I(xn; yn) + I(xn, yn;xn+1, yn+1)
+H(xn+1|xn) +H(yn+1|yn)
−H(xn+1, yn+1)
(9)
However under the assumption of stationarity
Pxn+1yn+1 = Pxnyn ⇒ H(xn+1, yn+1) = H(xn, yn)
and
I(xn, yn;xn+1, yn+1) = H(xn+1, yn+1) (10)
and substituting (10) in (9) we get
I(xn, xn+1; yn, yn+1) =I(xn; yn) +H(xn+1, yn+1)
+H(xn+1|xn) +H(yn+1|yn)
−H(xn+1, yn+1)⇒
I(xn, xn+1; yn, yn+1) =I(xn; yn)+
H(xn+1|xn) +H(yn+1|yn)
(11)
where H(xn+1|xn) ≥ 0 and H(yn+1|yn) ≥ 0. 
The exact calculation of the entropy rates H(xn+1|xn)
and H(yn+1|yn) requires the calculation of the Kolmogorov-
Sinai entropies of the time series comprised by the RSSI
measurements and is out of scope for this paper.
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